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The purpose of this paper is to determine the impact of mergers and acquisition on 
China’s IT firms and to make a reasonable conclusion as to whether the market 
reaction to M&A’s is good or bad. 99 acquirer firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2008 and 2012 were randomly chosen for this 
study. 
 
The Market model and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) were used in this paper 
to determine whether China’s IT firms’ value can be increased or decreased through 
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1.1 Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) 
Merger and acquisitions (M&A) is a broad concept and it refers to the restructuring and 
consolidation of two or more independent companies. More specifically, it means one 
company obtains the operational control and total or part of assets of another company 
through paying the cost with cash, stocks and debt. In M&A’s, the buyers and the sellers are 
usually called acquiring firms and target firms respectively.  
 
Strictly speaking, a merger or an acquisition is not exactly the same. The standard to 
distinguish mergers and acquisitions is based on three aspects.  
 
Firstly, to see if a new company is established. In mergers, two single companies agree to join 
together to establish a new one. In contrast, in acquisitions, an acquired firm loses its 
independent position and becomes a part of the acquiring firm.  
 
Secondly, the payment types are also one of the determinants on whether the transaction is a 
merger or an acquisition. Both parties tend to choose cash payment in acquisitions, thus the 
original shareholders of the acquired firm will be stripped from being shareholders after the 
transaction and the acquiring firm will be exposed to the post-merger risk. As to mergers, two 
firms will usually issue stocks of the newly established firm and share these stocks with the 





What is more, the size of the involving firms also helps distinguish mergers and acquisitions. 
Mergers usually take place between two firms with similar sizes while acquisitions are more 
like a purchase of a smaller firm by a larger one. 
 
The most popular classification of M&A is accordance with the market relations between the 
parties of the transaction. There are three basic types: 
 
A horizontal merger is usually between two companies who produce the same products or 
supply similar services, for example, the combination of two airlines or oil companies. The 
horizontal merger can remedy the deficiency of companies’ asset allocation and improve its 
competitive strength and profitability. It is a shortcut for companies to obtain assets, reduce 
costs, expand market share and enter new areas. However, the horizontal merger has its 
drawbacks in that it may harm the competitive power and lead to a monopoly or a market 
concentration in the industry. As a result, the efficiency of the entire economy may decline, 
making the regulation of the horizontal merger to become the focus of anti-trust acts. 
 
A vertical merger happens between two or more companies that have input and output 
relationship during the successive production stages of one product. In other words, these 
companies are not competitors, but demanders and suppliers. The vertical mergers can 
transform market transactions into internal ones thus improve the bargaining power of the 
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demanders which helps cut down the market risk, save transaction fees and make it easier to 
set entry barriers as well. 
 
Beside the above two M&A types, there is another one called conglomerate M&A, which 
takes place between two or more companies with different products. In the conglomerate 
M&A, acquiring firms and target firms are not only in different sectors, but also do not have 
vertical relationships. Simply speaking, when the acquiring firm is in different industries and 
different markets, also there is not close substitutive relations between the products of these 
industries, it is regarded as a conglomerate M&A. 
 
Through the conglomerate M&A, a company is able to involve a series of different products 
and services thus achieve multiple operations. A conglomerate M&A has several key effects 
such as diversifying the unsystematic risk, lowering the difficulty of entering new areas, 
helping implement the strategic risk. 
 
As an operational strategy, the motives of companies’ decisions on M&A are always the key 
point attracting economists. Although there are different ideas, some of them are broadly 
agreed on. 
 Economies of scale 
Economies of scale refer to the reduction of the unit cost by the improvement of production 
capacity. Companies can achieve internal economies of scale through M&A. M&A makes 
companies able to produce more and supply more distribution channels, which results in the 
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decline of costs. Besides, M&A transforms market transactions into internal ones so that all 
kinds of transaction obstacles and market defects due to the imperfect market would be 
overcome or reduced. 
 Under Valuation Theory 
The Under Valuation Theory asserts that the motive of M&A is the underestimation of 
companies’ value. Specifically speaking, when the market value of target firm’s stocks does 
not reflect the firm’s ‘true’ value, this could be the result of a more effective use of the target 
firm’s assets. 
 Entering a new industry 
The severe competition and multiple business risks make some companies tend to change its 
single business strategy. Seeking an existing company in the target sector and making a 
consolidation not only diversifies the firm, but reduces entry risks. 
 Obtaining advanced technology and talents 
The market competition is in essence the competition of technology and management talent. 
Acquiring firms control the operation through M&A and then consequently gain the target 
firms’ technology and talent. 
 Synergy effects 
Synergy effects refer to the company’s competitive strength being improved after M&A. Its 
free cash flow exceeds the sum of two single companies’ expected free cash flow, which 
means the intrinsic value of the company after M&A is higher than the total of companies’ 
before M&A. The rationale behind this is because some company’s resources can be used 




1.2 Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) is one of two exchanges on the Chinese mainland. It 
was established on November 26
th
 1990 and started the business on December 19
th
 1990. 
According to the total value of market capitalization, until 2012, SSE was ranked as the sixth 
largest stock exchange in the world and is a member of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Asian and Oceanian Stock Exchanges Federation 
(AOSEF), World Federation of Exchanges (WFE). The market currently has 954 listed 
companies with a total market capitalization of ￥15.7 trillion with ten basic sectors: energy, 
material, industrial, finance, information, utility, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, 
health care and telecommunications. 
 
1.3 Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) is another stock exchange in the Chinese Mainland. It 
was established on December 1
st
 1990 and started business on July 3
rd
 1991. In the past 
twenty years, SZSE was grown rapidly with 1540 listed companies with a total market 
capitalization of about ￥7.17 trillion by the end of 2012. It devotes itself to Chinese small 
and medium-sized enterprises’ development. In May 2004, a SME sector was established and 
in October 2009, the Growth Enterprise Market sector officially started. The frame of 
multi-level capital market had been basically established. 
 
1.4 CSI300 Index 
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The CSI300 Index is a capitalization-weighted stock market index designed to reflect the 
performance of the whole A-shares market in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
The index was compiled by the China Securities Index Company, Ltd.. It was released on 
April 8th, 2005 and its value is normalized relative to a base of 1000 on December 31st, 2004. 
CSI300 covers 60% of the total market capitalization of both SSE and SZSE, so it is regarded 
as the best representative of Chinese A-shares market. 
 
1.5 China’s Information Technology (IT) Industry 
The Chinese information technology industry is growing rapidly in recent years and is 
becoming an important economic pillar. For example, whether the IT industry develops well 
will affect GDP’s growth. According to the National Development and Reform Commission’s 
statistics, the gross output of Chinese software industry was only ￥59.3 billion in 2000 
while this amount became ￥230 billion by 2004. However, the bottleneck of the IT industry 
reflects the contradiction between the supply of IT products and public demand which is 
caused by the small-scale production in the industry. Therefore, more and more IT firms turn 
to solve this problem through mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, the globalization 
and the rapid development of information technology make Chinese IT companies having to 
set a global development plan. In short, the economic globalization has accelerated Chinese 
IT firms’ M&A. According to Deloitte & Touch’s overseas trading report (2012), about 
technology, media and telecommunications sectors during late 2010 and early 2011, IT 
companies perform the most actively. Tencent, Shenda, Wanmei and the Nine City 




There are two main modes of Chinese IT companies’ globalization: one is M&A and another 
is to invest abroad to set up factories. The representatives of the former are TCL and Lenovo 
and Haier is typically the latter one. However, Haier considered acquiring Maytag in 2009, 
which shows M&A had become an important alternative to Chinese IT companies during the 
globalization process. 
 
1.6 Organization of the Study 
In Chapter 2, the concept of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) will be briefly introduced. 
Then the paper will discuss some previous academic studies on M&A. In Chapter 3, this 
paper will use the Market Model, Average Abnormal Return Model (AAR) and Average 
Cumulative Abnormal Return Model (ACAR) methodologies to explain the rationale about 
how to measure the impact of M&A. The analysis of results is in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 






2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) originated in the early 20
th
 century. A French 
Mathematician named Louis Baehelier applied statistical methods in analyzing stocks’ return, 
finding that the mathematical expectation of the return is always zero. 
In 1965, Eugene Fama published “Random Walks in Stock Market Prices” in the Financial 
Analysis Journal and was the first to mention the concept of an Efficient Market. The prices 
of securities in a market reflect all available information. 
 
There are two signs to examine whether the market is efficient: one is whether the prices can 
change freely according to the information; another is whether the information can be 
disclosed fully and equally to the investors to make them acquire the information with the 
same quality and quantity at the same time. 
 
According to this hypothesis, investors will use all the information rapidly and efficiently 
when they buy and sell stocks. All known factors that can affect the stock prices have been 
reflected in the stock prices, thus technical analysis is useless. There are three forms under the 
EMH: 
 Weak-Form Market Efficiency 
EMH believes that under weak-form market efficiency, the market prices fully reflect the 
historical price information including transaction prices and volume. Technical analysis on 
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the stock prices is useless. If investors do not use the information beside the price series, the 
best estimation of tomorrow’s price is today’s price. Fundamental analysis, in the contrast, 
may still help investors to get excess returns. 
 Semi-Strong-Form Market Efficiency 
The hypothesis believes that prices have reflected all public information including transaction 
prices, volume, earnings, earning prediction, company’s management condition and so on. If 
investors can acquire such information quickly, the stock prices should respond to it rapidly. 
This is because given current disclosed information, current prices are appropriate. The 
price’s changes in the future do not relate to disclosed information but based on new 
information disclosed tomorrow. Under the semi-strong-form market efficiency, both 
technical analysis and fundamental analysis become useless. Only inside information may 
help obtain excess return. 
 Strong-Form Market Efficiency 
The strong-form market efficiency hypothesis asserts that all the information about 
company’s operation, including disclosed information and inside information have been 
reflected in the stock price. No methods can help investors obtain excess return even knowing 
inside information. To the management of the portfolio, strong-form market efficiency is 
often set to be the environment. Under strong-form market efficiency, the portfolio managers 
will choose passive style, seeking the average returns of the market. 
 
2.2 Event Studies on M&A 
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Like a dividend payment, stock split and the change of management members, a M&A is 
regarded as an event in the company. The most popular method to measure if the event does 
have an impact on the company’s stock price is to utilize an event study. It examines whether 
the stock price reacts to an event so that abnormal returns are generated. 
 
Fuller, et al (2002) perform an event study on the data collected from Securities Data 
Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database, finding that for 1990 and 2000 
acquirers’ returns are significantly negative when target firms are public firms and are 
significantly positive when target firms are private firms. Their sample covered acquiring 
firms that had at least 5 M&A’s. 
 
Chang (1998) studied on the acquirers’ returns as they announce to acquiring privately held 
target firms including 291 cases between 1981 and 1992 in the U.S. market. The acquirers’ 
information was collected from the Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News Retrieval. He 
found that although there are abnormal returns to acquirer firms in cash payments by 
examining acquirers’ returns, they were not statistically significant. In the condition that 
acquirer firms and target firms share the stocks, the acquirer firms have a positive abnormal 
return. 
 
Hansen and Lott (1996) investigated 252 worldwide purchasers acquiring private and public 
targets during 1985 to 1991. The data came from the Lotus OneSource database. The results 
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shows that the purchasers have a two percent higher return when the target firm is a private 
firm. 
 
Bellamy and Lewin’s (1992) focus was on the Australian Stock Exchange, selecting a sample 
composed of 52 stock offer cases and 81 cash payments cases involving listed companies 
from January 1st 1980 to July 31
st
 1988. They find that on the M&A’s announcement day, the 
acquirer firms earn a significantly negative abnormal return of 2.97% in stock offers cases 
and an insignificant return of 0. 03% in 8 cash payments cases. 
 
Bugeja and Walter (1995) also for Australia find that acquirer firms with stock offers earn 
significantly positive abnormal returns during the event window which was from 60 days 
before the announcement to one day after the announcement. However, they earn 
significantly negative abnormal returns with cash payments during the event window. 
Although the cumulative abnormal returns during the event window support the Bellamy and 
Lewin’s finding, Bugeja and Walter’s study results show that the acquirer firms do experience 
significant positive abnormal returns when using cash payments. 
 
Travlos (1987) performs an event study on a sample composed of the cases from 1972 to 
1981 in the U.S. market and finds that when the transaction uses stock offers, the acquirer 
firms experience significant losses due to the M&A announcement and when the transaction 




The previous event studies categorize the acquirer firms according to the properties and 
payments respectively and examined whether there exist abnormal returns during the M&A’s 
announcement period and the differences between groups of observations. This paper is going 








The rationale of an event study is to examine whether the stock price moves to generate 
abnormal returns when an event happens in order to make sure the fluctuation is due to the 
event in question. The study will select the M&A’s announcement day as t=0. Then design 
four scenarios with different size of event window which is 3-day, 7-day, 11-day and 15-day. 
The return during the whole event window is denominated as R0. Beside the event window, 
the study needs to determine an estimation window fixed as 30 trading days which is 180 
trading days before the announcement day. We use R-1 to represent the return of estimation 
window. 
 
The study will calculate R-1, R0 and then make a comparison between them. The difference 
between R0 and R-1 measures the impact of M&A announcement on stock price. If R0 is 
bigger than both R-1 and zero and statistically significant, an M&A’s announcement has an 
impact on a stock price’s movements. The difference between R0 and R-1 shows the added 
value due to the M&A. 
 
Figure 3.1 
estimation window                            event window (n=1,3,5,7) 
I------------------------I-----------------------I------------------------I--------------------------I 
t=-210         t=-180           t=-n              t=0              t=+n  
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The objective to design four scenarios is to examine if there is a delayed market response to 
the M&A announcements. 
 
3.2 Models 
3.2.1 Market Model 
Semi-strong form EMH is tested, using the Market Model. Firstly, we have to calculate the 




− 1 ····························································3.1 
where: 
𝑅𝑡 = return on stock during period t 
𝑃𝑡 = stock price during period t 
𝑃𝑡−1 = stock price during period t-1 
Secondly, the following formula represents the Market Model. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ?̂?i + β̂i𝑅𝑚.𝑡 + εi,t  ···················································3.2 
where: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = return on security I during period t 
?̂?i = intercept of the equation for security i 
β̂i = slope of the equation for security i 
𝑅𝑚.𝑡 = return on the market during period t 
εi,t = error term 
STATA is used for the regression on Equation 3.2 and where 𝑅𝑚.𝑡 was the CSI300 Index 




When doing the regression, there are four assumptions as follows: 
The expected value of the random error e: E(e)=0 
The variance of the random error e: var(e)=σ2 
The covariance between any pair of random errors ei and ej: cov(ei, ej)=0 
The values of e are normally distributed about their mean: e～N(0, σ2) 
 
3.2.2 Abnormal Returns (AR) & Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) & Average 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) 
 Abnormal Return (AR) 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 – (α̂i  +  β̂i 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)  ··············································3.3 
where, 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = the abnormal return on security I during period t. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = return on security i during period t. 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = index 
α̂i and β̂i come from Equation 3.2 and 𝑅𝑚.𝑡 is CSI300 Index return during period t. 
 




∑𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  ························································3.4 
where, N represents the number of securities. 
T-test: 
H0: 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡= 0, which means the market is efficient. 
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Ha: 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡≠0, which means the market is inefficient. 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, investors cannot obtain excess return after 
M&A announcement if the market is semi-strong efficient. 
 
 Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (ACAR) 




∑𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡  ·····················································3.6 
H0: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 0, which means the market is efficient. 
Ha: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡  0, which means the market is inefficient. 
 
3.3 Data Description 
There are two datasets in all. The event dates dataset has two columns: company id and event 
dates. The stock data has four columns: company id, date, daily returns and market daily 
returns. The companies used to perform the event study are chosen to satisfy the requirements 
as follows: 
 The companies come from the A-shares market of the SSE and SZSE; 
 The companies had been public for more than one year until the announcement date and 
last for more than one year after that day; 
 If in an event window, there are more than once M&A for one company, then only the 
first time is used. 
 
3.4 Data Sources 
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The study will use the data from the CSMAR which provides a range of information 
including accounting, finance, and economic data for China relating to stock trading, 
financial statements of China listed firms, investment fund, information disclosure, IPOs, 
corporate governance, bond trade and quote, M&A and asset restructuring; cash and stock 





Analysis of Results 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter will use STATA to analyze the sample comprised of 99 companies during the 
period from 2008 to 2012 to see if the announcements bring abnormal returns and in which 
time period the abnormal returns exist. The results can also be the evidence on whether the 
target market is semi-strong efficient. 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
A regression analysis is usually used to check if there is a linear relationship between two 
variables. Before the event study, we will run a general regression to see if the China’s IT 
industry firms’ returns are tracking the Index returns. The sample includes the data from 
January 4
th
, 2007 to August 2
nd
, 2013. The results are exhibited as follows: 
Table 4.1 
 
As is shown in Table 4.1, the intercept coefficient α is 0.0012557 which means even if the 
Index return is zero, as a whole, the IT industry firms have a return at 0.12557%. The slope 
coefficient of the Market Model β is 0.9776535. β is regarded to measure the sensitivity of 
a security in responding to the changes of market return. The larger the β is, the more 
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sensitive the security is. 0.9776535 is a high β value which means the China’s IT firms’ 
returns are relatively easier to move due to the changes of market return. 
 
Another meaningful value is R-squared, which is used to measure the goodness of fit of the 
regression. The R-squared value is between 0 and 1. The larger the value is, the better the 
regression fits the observations in the sample. In this case, R-squared is only 0.1999 which is 
very low, meaning that the China’s IT firms’ returns do not have a linear relationship with the 
market return. 
 
4.3 Cumulative Abnormal Return Results 
We design four scenarios to examine if there is cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and if it is 
statistically significant using event window methodology. The difference of the four scenarios 
is the size of the event window while the estimation window is fixed as 30 trading days 
which is 180 trading days before the announcement date. 
 
4.3.1 3-Day Event Window Scenario 
In this scenario, we chose 3 days as an event window, including one day before the event date, 





The P value is 0.361 which is larger than 0.05, so we accept the null hypothesis that CAR = 0. 
This means that during the 3-day event window, cumulative abnormal returns are not 
statistically significant, which seems to prove that the market is semi-strong efficient. 
 
4.3.2 7-Day Event Window Scenario 
In this scenario, we chose 7 days as an event window including 3 days before the event date, 
the event date and 3 days after the event date. The results are as follows: 
Table 4.3 
 
The P value is 0.124 which is larger than 0.05, so we accept the null hypothesis that CAR = 0. 
This means that during the 7-day event window, once more cumulative abnormal returns are 
not statistically significant, which also seems to prove that the market is semi-strong efficient. 
 
4.3.3 11-Day Event Window Scenario 
In this scenario, we chose 11 days as an event window including 5 days before the event date, 





The P value is 0.001 which is under 0.05, so we reject the null hypothesis that CAR = 0. This 
means that during the 11-day event window, there is statistically significant negative 
cumulative abnormal returns of -1.82165%, which proves that the market is not semi-strong 
efficient. 
 
4.3.4 15-Day Event Window Scenario 
In this scenario, we chose 15 days as an event window including 7 days before the event date, 
the event date and 7 days after the event date. The results are as follows: 
Table 4.5 
 
The P value is almost zero which is under 0.05, so we reject the null hypothesis that CAR = 0. 
This means that during the 15-day event window, there is statistically significant negative 






As we expand the event window, the cumulative abnormal returns become statistically 
significant negative. This is probably because that the market has a delayed response to the 
M&A event, which supports that China’s IT industry market is not semi-strong efficient. 
 






The purpose of this paper is to determine the impact of M&A of China’s IT firms. It examines 
whether M&A can increase or reduce value for the IT firms in China. Also it can be 
concluded if China’s IT industry market is semi-strong efficient. The study uses daily 
securities’ returns of acquiring firms during 2008 and 2012 in the China’s IT industry to 
perform the empirical research. 
 
The results of the research can be concluded as follows: 
1. The securities in China’s IT sector do not track the movement of the CSI300 Index due to 
the low R-square value. 
2. Statistically significant cumulative abnormal return exist when the event window is 
expanded, which means the market does not respond to the event rapidly, in other words, 
the market is not semi-strong efficient. 
3. The cumulative abnormal return is significant negative, meaning the M&A’s reduce 
value for China’s IT companies. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
Improving the market efficiency is in essence to solve the problems in the process of forming 
the securities’ prices, including the disclosure, the delivery, the realizing and the feedback of 
the information. The most key point is to establish a system of compulsory disclosure of 
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information. This system is the base of efficient capital markets as well as the origin of 
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Date Acquirer Name 
Acquirer 
Code 
09-11-25 Shenzhen Kaifa Technology Co., Ltd. 000021 
11-09-08 China Greatwall Computer Shenzhen Co., Ltd.  000066 
09-01-14 Shenzhen SDG Information Co., Ltd. 000070 
10-06-28 Chinascholars Group Co., Ltd. 000547 
10-07-29 Shaanxi Fenghuo Electronics Co., Ltd. 000561 
09-03-17 Greatwall Information Industry Co.,Ltd.  000748 
08-07-14 Sichuan Jiuzhou Electronic Co.,Ltd.  000801 
09-06-02 Tianjin Xinmao Science＆Technology Co.,Ltd.  000836 
12-12-25 Gohigh Data Networks Technology Co.,Ltd.  000851 
09-11-23 Stellar Megaunion Corporation  000892 
10-12-28 Soyea Technology Co.,Ltd.  000909 
08-05-15 Inspur Electronic Information Industry Co.,Ltd.  000977 
09-12-18 Eastcompeace Smart Card Co.,Ltd.  002017 
09-10-27 Hedy Holding Co.,Ltd.  002027 
12-04-23 Shenzhen Coship Electronics Co.,Ltd.  002052 
10-03-31 YGSOFT Inc.  002063 
09-10-23 DHC SOFTWARE Co.,Ltd. 002065 
09-12-03 Mesnac Co.,Ltd.  002073 
08-03-28 Suzhou New Sea Union Telecom Technology Co., Ltd.  002089 
08-04-02 Guomai Technologies,Inc.  002093 
08-05-05 Zhejiang NetSun Co.,Ltd.  002095 
10-02-12 Sunwave Communications Co., Ltd.  002115 
10-04-27 Beijing Bewinner Communications Co.,Ltd.  002148 
10-11-02 Beijing BDStar Navigation Co.,Ltd.  002151 
09-04-24 Beijing Shiji Information Technology Co.,Ltd.  002153 
10-12-31 Invengo Information Technology Co., Ltd.  002161 
08-12-02 Shanghai Hi-Tech Control System Co.,Ltd.  002184 
11-04-13 Shanghai Hyron Software Co.,Ltd.  002195 
11-11-03 Anhui USTC iFLYTEK Co.,Ltd.  002230 
11-02-11 Wisesoft Co.,Ltd.  002253 
10-09-29 Talkweb Information System Co.,Ltd.  002261 
11-03-30 Beijing Join-Cheer Software CO., LTD.  002279 
11-11-15 Hangzhou New Century Information Technology Co.,Ltd.  002280 
12-12-04 Accelink Technologies Co.,Ltd.  002281 
11-10-21 HeNan Splendor Science & Technology Co., Ltd.  002296 
11-01-27 Sunsea Telecommunications Co.,Ltd.  002313 
11-03-08 Shenzhen Keybridge Communications Co.,Ltd.  002316 
11-09-23 Anhui Wantong Technology Co.,Ltd.  002331 
12-04-19 Taiji Computer Corporation Limited  002368 
11-09-20 Shenzhen Zowee Tech. Co., Ltd.  002369 
12-12-26 China Shipping Network Technology Co.,Ltd.  002401 
11-11-25 Navinfo Co.,Ltd.  002405 
31 
 
12-07-24 Shenzhen Das Intellitech Co., Ltd.  002421 
12-05-15 Guangzhou Haige Communications Group Incorporated Co. 002465 
12-11-06 Net263 Co.,Ltd.  002467 
12-05-29 Hytera Communications Corporation Limited  002583 
11-03-09 Beijing Ultrapower Software Co.,Ltd.  300002 
12-07-11 Wangsu Science & Technology Co.,Ltd.  300017 
11-01-25 Enjoyor Co.,Ltd.  300020 
10-12-30 Hangzhou Huaxing Chuangye Communication Technology Co. 300025 
11-04-19 Beijing Supermap Software Co.,Ltd.  300036 
12-08-03 Beijing Miteno Communication Technology Co.,Ltd.  300038 
12-11-20 Hwa Create Co. Ltd.  300045 
11-05-13 Xiamen 35.Com Technology Co.,Ltd.  300051 
12-12-06 Beijing eGOVA Co,.Ltd.  300075 
12-06-07 Sumavision Technologies Co.,Ltd.  300079 
12-03-06 Shenzhen Info tech Technologies Co.,Ltd.  300085 
12-12-25 YLZ Information Technology Co., Ltd.  300096 
11-11-21 Gosuncn technology group Co., Ltd.  300098 
12-05-10 Shenzhen Tat Fook Technology Co.,Ltd.  300134 
12-03-23 Beijing Orient National Communication Science & Tech 300166 
12-09-28 Hand Enterprise Solutions Co.,Ltd.  300170 
12-03-16 Beijing Jetsen Technology Co.,Ltd.  300182 
12-12-13 Xiamen Meiya Pico Information Co., Ltd.  300188 
12-07-12 Beijing TRS Information Technology Co.,Ltd.  300229 
12-12-21 Hangzhou CNCR-IT Co.,Ltd.  300250 
12-12-20 Chongqing mas sci.&Tech.Co.,Ltd.  300275 
12-11-22 China United Network Communications Limited  600050 
08-10-31 Sundy Land Investment Co.,Ltd.  600077 
08-06-03 Tsinghuatongfang Co.,Ltd.  600100 
09-04-28 Jiangsu Etern Co.,Ltd.  600105 
10-08-17 Ningbo Bird Co.,Ltd.  600130 
08-10-28 Datang Telecom Technology Co.,Ltd.  600198 
09-01-07 Aisino Co.Ltd.  600271 
09-04-02 Daheng New Epoch Technology, Inc.  600288 
09-04-30 Bright Oceans Inter-Telecom Corporation  600289 
10-05-21 Wuhan Yangtze Communication Industry Group Co.,Ltd.  600345 
12-08-01 Tiancheng Co.,Ltd. of Taiyuan University of Technology  600392 
12-11-07 NARI Technology Development Limited Company  600406 
11-07-28 Beijing Teamsun Technology Co.,Ltd.  600410 
08-07-22 Hengtong Optic-Electric Co.,Ltd.  600487 
11-12-13 Fiberhome Telecommunication Technologies Co.,Ltd.  600498 
11-12-14 Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology Co., Ltd.  600522 
10-09-28 China National Software & Service Co., Ltd.  600536 
08-10-24 Hundsun Technologies Inc.  600570 
09-09-01 Yonyou Software Co., Ltd.  600588 
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10-09-29 Shanghai Broadband Technology Co.,Ltd.  600608 
11-04-29 Besttone Holding Co.,Ltd.  600640 
12-10-08 Shanghai Potevio Co.,Ltd.  600680 
11-01-11 Neusoft Corporation  600718 
10-06-29 Pci-suntek Technology Co., Ltd.  600728 
12-01-19 Shandong Inspur software Co.,Ltd.  600756 
11-11-18 Nanjing Panda Electronics Co., Ltd.  600775 
12-10-31 Insigma Technology Co.,Ltd.  600797 
11-09-09 Chengdu Dr. Peng Telecom&Media Group Co.,Ltd.  600804 
12-06-20 Shanghai Baosight Software Co.,Ltd.  600845 
12-06-21 Shanghai East-China Computer Co.,Ltd. 600850 
10-04-22 Anhui Sun-Create Electronics Co., Ltd.  600990 
12-02-28 Shanghai Great Wisdom Co., Ltd.  601519 
 
 
